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I
INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING OF “NEVER”
What does “never” mean? This question was illustrated by a problem in Charles Kittel
and Herbert Kroemer’s textbook Thermal Physics, in which the authors discussed a popular
hypothetical: the so-called infinite monkey theorem.1 The authors posed a problem:

±

Dual B.A., Wake Forest University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013. The original idea
for this paper comes from my friend and classmate Ryan Delaney, who first conceptualized the idea of a computer
generating copyrighted material. I also want to thank other members of Prof. Oskar Liivak’s Topics in Intellectual
Property seminar (as well as Prof. Liivak himself), all of who provided critical ideas and feedback as this paper was
written. Credit for part of the title, as well as a very preliminary version of this idea, should also be given to Robert
Rogoyski. See Robert Rogoyski, The Melody Machine: How to Kill Copyright, and Other Problems with Protecting
Discrete Musical Elements, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 347 (2006).
1
CHARLES KITTEL & HERBERT KROEMER, THERMAL PHYSICS 53 (W H Freeman & Co 1980).
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Suppose that 1010 monkeys have been seated at typewriters through the age of the
universe, 1018. This number of monkeys is about three times greater than the present
human population of the earth. We suppose that a monkey can hit 10 typewriter keys per
second. A typewriter may have 44 keys; we accept lowercase in place of capital letters.
Assuming that Shakespeare’s Hamlet has 105 characters, will the monkeys hit upon
Hamlet?2
As one may imagine from the context of the question, the point of Kittel and Kroemer’s
question was to illustrate that monkeys would effectively never type out Hamlet:
The probability that a monkey-Hamlet will be typed in the age of the universe is
approximately 10164316. The probability of Hamlet is therefore zero in any operational
sense of an event, so that the original statement . . . is nonsense: one book, much less a
library, will never occur in the total literary production of the monkeys.3
Perhaps thankfully, this paper does not argue that monkeys could potentially produce
Hamlet. But it does seek to prove a related point: modern technology has made it theoretically
possible for a computer system (rather than a monkey) to intentionally generate copyrightable
work, and copyright law may have difficulty reacting to such an innovation. In fact, this method
of content generation – which I call brute-force content creation – could be a very troublesome
loophole in copyright law.
In Part II, I analyze the cryptanalytic method known as brute-forcing4 and how it could be
used to generate copyrightable content such as images5 and audio.6 Brute-forcing, in layman’s
terms, is a way in which a computer generates every possible variation (or permutation) of a
string.7 While brute-forcing has been traditionally used to guess encrypted passwords, I explain
that it could be used to generate copyrightable content.8 Though I conclude that it is not yet

2

Id.
Id.
4
See infra Part II.
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part II.C.
3
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technically feasible to brute-force copyrighted content,9 I devote a short subpart to discussing
how one might optimize an algorithm to make the process technically feasible.10
In Part III, I discuss whether or not such content could be copyrighted.11 I first analyze
the underlying doctrine that makes brute-force content creation so appealing and so possible: the
doctrine of independent creation.12 I then turn to whether or not such content would actually be
copyrightable, focusing on how the relatively weak “modicum of creativity” standard may be a
bar where an algorithm blindly creates content.13
In Part IV, I turn to the legal ramifications of brute-forcing copyrighted content.14 First, I
address the infringement ramifications of operating a brute-forcing algorithm intended to create
every possible permutation of creative content.15 Second, I discuss problems of contributory
liability in two contexts: allowing parties to search through brute-forced content, and allowing
third parties to buy and/or acquire brute-forced content.16 Third, I discuss how brute-force
content creation could potentially infringe trademark.17 Finally, I discuss the ramifications of a
blatant attack on copyright from the perspective of a legal realist.18
I conclude in Part V, explaining why it is a good thing that it is currently impossible to
brute-force content.19

9

Id.
See infra Part II.D.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Part III.A.
13
See infra Part III.B.
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See infra Part IV.A.
16
See infra Part IV.B.
17
See infra Part IV.C.
18
See infra Part IV.D.
19
See infra Part V.
10

Sigmon 4

II
BRUTE FORCE ATTACKS 101
Before I begin an analysis of the legal ramifications of a brute-force attack on
copyrightable material, I must explain how such brute-force attacks would be feasible at all. As
relatively laborious as this explanation is, it helps illustrate why such an algorithm is, in
consideration of modern technology, purely theoretical.
How hard is it to guess a password? The answer is, “it depends.” When passwords are
stored in plain text – that is, when they are stored exactly as the user enters them – all it takes for
a nefarious party to acquire a user’s password is access to the computer storing the user’s
password itself. But this is a rare event: most modern websites and services use cryptographic
functions like MD5,20 which are one-way non-reversible encryption algorithms.21

These

encryption algorithms take an input (usually a password) and generate a long, unique,22 and undecipherable fingerprint-like string (a “message digest”).23 The upshot of these one-way nonreversible encryption algorithms is that, even if a nefarious hacker got access to many of these
“fingerprints,” there would be no way for them to un-encrypt the “fingerprints” themselves.24
But one-way encryption algorithms like MD5 are not fool-proof: there are many ways in
which someone with an one-way-encrypted string could eventually determine what a user’s
password is.

20

“Rainbow tables,” or pre-calculated lists of what-password-equals-what-

MD5 is an acronym for “Message Digest Algorithm 5.” See R. Rivest, Network Working Group, RFC
1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DATATRACKER (Apr. 1992),
available at http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc1321/.
21
See generally id.
22
This is no longer the case with MD5, which is susceptible to collision attacks. See Tao Xie & Dengguo
Feng, How to Find Weak Input Differences for MD5 Collision Attacks, CRYPTOLOGY (May 30, 2009), available at
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/223.pdf (finding weak input differences in the MD5 protocol).
23
R. Rivest, Network Working Group, RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DATATRACKER (Apr. 1992), available at http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc1321/ (“It is
conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, or to
produce any message having a given prespecified target message digest.”).
24
At least insofar as the mechanisms behind algorithms like MD5 remain a secret.
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fingerprint, are commonplace online and relatively easy to find.25 But these tables are often
limited to what is computationally feasible: many only cover passwords up to 10 characters in
length.26

Some forms of social engineering,27 such as pretending to be tech support and

verifying a user-provided password against a “fingerprint,” also work in certain circumstances.28
But there is another option that is relevant not only to password cracking, but also to the
world of copyright: brute-force attacks.
A brute-force attack is a cryptanalytic29 attack that exhaustively guesses every possible
permutation of a string until it finds the correct solution.30 As the title implies, brute-forcing is
more or less the cryptanalytic equivalent of jamming random thin objects into a lock until it
opens – it entails guessing every single possible option until one option eventually works. In the
context of the cryptographic “fingerprints” mentioned above, it involves encrypting every single
possible string until the right “fingerprint” comes out, which means you have input the user’s
password.
The number of potential variations of a string (like a password) is calculated using two
variables: the number of characters usable in the target string (the “character set”), and the
maximum length of the target string: 31
 

25



         

!

For example, the RainbowCrack project lists a large number of LM, NTLM, MD5, and SHA1 rainbow
tables. List of Rainbow Tables, RAINBOWCRACK PROJECT, available at http://project-rainbowcrack.com/table.htm
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
26
See id. (the longest table, “md5_loweralpha-numeric#1-10,” which contains passwords up to 10
characters long, only covers lower alphanumeric characters).
27
Social engineering is the art of tricking people into divulging secret information, including passwords.
This can include everything from pretending to be corporate tech support to creating false log-in forms that record a
user’s password. See generally JOHNNY LONG & KEVIN D MITNICK, NO TECH HACKING: A GUIDE TO SOCIAL
ENGINEERING, DUMPSTER DIVING, AND SHOULDER SURFING (2008).
28
See id.
29
Cryptanalysis is “is the science and sometimes art of breaking cryptosystems.” CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN
PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 3 (2010).
30
Id. at 7.
31
See NICK MOLDOVYAN & ALEX MOLDOVYAN, INNOVATIVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 63 (2nd ed. 2007).
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As the length of a string exponentially increases the number of its permutations, bruteforce attacks are ridiculously inefficient against relatively lengthy passwords.

By way of

example, assuming a password potentially comprised of the full 95 printable ASCII characters32
with a maximum length of 8 characters (such as the string “C()rnell”):
 



 “Crnell”  95+  6,634,204,312,890,625

In other words, this password would have well over six quadrillion possible variations.
While a computer attempting to brute force this password may not have to calculate every single
one of these permutations to discover the password is “C()rnell” (it might begin with “C” before
it goes to “D” and thus try “C()rnell” before it tries “D()rnell”), this large number of
permutations all but guarantees that any effort to guess a password would require an incredible
amount of time and computing power.33
In comparison, a much shorter password comprised of nothing but the 26 lower case
letters of the alphabet and only 5 characters – say, the word “cases” – would only have nearly 12
million possible permutations:
 



 “cases”  267  11,881,376

It is thus easy to understand why websites like Facebook that require a password prefer
lengthy passwords using more than the lower-case alphabet:34 doing so raises the potential
number of permutations (and thus the difficulty of brute-forcing a password) exponentially.

32

See RANDALL HYDE, THE ART OF ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE § 2.14.1 (2nd ed. 2010).
For a full discussion of the computing power required to brute-force strings, see infra Part II.C.
34
For example, Facebook’s help guide asks that users make a password “at least 6 characters long” using
“a complex combination of numbers, letters, and punctuation marks.” What is the Minimum Password Strength and
How Can I Make My Password Strong?, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/help/124904560921566 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2013).
33
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A. IMAGES AND VIDEO
Because digital images can be reduced to a string in a manner not dissimilar to a
password, it is theoretically feasible to brute-force an image.
Digital images are displayed using pixels – that is, miniature dots on a computer monitor
that, when placed together in a matrix, display an image. For example, Google’s default main
page logo is 550 pixels wide and 190 pixels tall35 – in other words, a series of 104,500 pixels.
Each pixel in the Google logo is, for compression reasons, 8 bits, which allows each pixel to
display one of 256 colors.36 This is as if the Google logo was a 104,500 character string
comprised of a 256 character color alphabet:
 



 9:; ;:  256<=>,7==

Suffice to say, the number of permutations of the Google logo is rather large: too large to
print here, and certainly too large to brute force. More specifically, the length of the number of
permutations itself has 251,662 decimal digits – more than two hundred times more decimal
digits than characters in this paragraph. This result does not even involve an image with an
aesthetically pleasing number of colors: most images today use 24-bit color, which allows for
16,777,216 different possible colors in a single pixel.37
Even smaller, less detailed images still result in an incredible number of permutations.
For example, a 1-bit image (that is, an image with only black pixels and white pixels) with 100
pixels (that is, an image 10 pixels wide and 10 pixels tall) would still have

35

See [Google Logo], https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo4w.png.
See id.
37
I am omitting a discussion of 32-bit color because it only adds 256 levels of transparency, which are
unlikely to be used in most copyrighted images. See Bit Depth, U. OF CAMBRIDGE DEP’T OF CHEMICAL
ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, http://www.ceb.cam.ac.uk/pages/bit-depth.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
For similar reasons, I omit a discussion of all forms of so-called “deep color” consisting of more than 24 bits per
pixel, as such a color gamut is unnecessary for brute-forcing purposes. See JOE CELKO, JOE CELKO'S THINKING IN
SETS: AUXILIARY, TEMPORAL, AND VIRTUAL TABLES IN SQL 168 (Morgan Kaufmann 2008).
36
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1,267,650,600,228,229,401,496,703,205,376 (that is, over one nonillion) permutations. That is
more permutations than there are grains of sand on the earth.38
There is an alternative approach to brute-forcing very large images with an astronomical
numbers of pixels: bitwise brute-forcing. All computer data is currently39 stored as strings of
zeroes and ones, known as bits.40 Instead of brute-forcing an image pixel-by-pixel, it may be
more feasible to brute-force larger images bit-by-bit. For example, wallpaper images often have
a resolution of 1920 pixels by 1080 pixels, which is the width and height of a 1080p/1080i
screen.41 When somewhat compressed42 into a JPEG file, such an image with a bit depth of 24
bits (or 16,777,216 colors) can be as small as 490 kilobytes, or 4,014,080 bits.43 The difference
in permutations can be staggering:
 

F
 

 G  H 16.6  ;;  J  ; J : 


F

38

 1920?1080  : @A B ?;C  16,777,216D,E=>,===



 1920?1080  : @K L9, 44  G C  2>,=<>,=+=

 G  H 1.2  ;;  J  ; J : 

Researchers estimate that there are approximately 7.5 x 1018 (or roughly seven quintillion) grains of sand
on the earth. See Robert Krulwich, Which Is Greater, The Number Of Sand Grains On Earth Or Stars In The Sky?,
NPR KRULWICH WONDERS (Sept. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/krulwich/2012/09/17/161096233/which-is-greater-the-number-of-sand-grains-on-earth-orstars-in-the-sky.
39
Quantum computing “qbits” may replace traditional bits in the future. See TZVETAN S. METODI, ARVIN I.
FARUQUE & FREDERIC T. CHONG, QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR COMPUTER ARCHITECTS 7 (2011) (discussing
classical bits and quantum signal states).
40
See id.
41
See generally EUR. BROADCASTING UNION, HIGH DEFINITION (HD) IMAGE FORMATS FOR TELEVISION
PRODUCTION (Dec. 2004), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20091229093957/http://tech.ebu.ch/docs/tech/tech3299.pdf.
42
Using a JPEG quality rating of 70 in Adobe Photoshop CS6. This is a very rough approximation – JPEG
images of the same resolution often vary in terms of their quality and size. A true JPEG-based brute-forcing
algorithm would unquestionably need to account for such variation.
43
Assuming “kilobyte” means 8,192 bits.
44
This is an oversimplified example of brute-forcing JPEG. To actually conduct JPEG brute-forcing, the
algorithm would have to somewhat intelligently brute-force based upon the JPEG File Interchange Format, which
would include adding, among other things, file headers. See generally ERIC HAMILTON, JPEG FILE INTERCHANGE
FORMAT VERSION 1.02 (1992), available at http://www.w3.org/Graphics/JPEG/jfif3.pdf.
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Thus, in certain circumstances, it may be efficient to abandon the pixel-by-pixel approach
described above and instead simply brute-force an image bit-by-bit.
Using similar principles, it would be entirely feasible to turn any of these images into
video. Such a video could be comprised of already brute-forced images, which themselves
become the character set for a string comprised of frames. For example, at 24 frames per second,
a one-hour silent movie the size of the Google logo would simply add another exponent:
 



     ; H J  256<=>,7==

+M,>==

B. AUDIO
Like images, audio can be expressed as a series of bits. Thus, just like how images can
be brute-forced bit-by-bit,45 audio could theoretically be brute-forced bit-by-bit.
Audio files (such as MP3 files) of songs are usually available in a wide range of bit rates;
however, enthusiast testing has generally come to the conclusion that few listeners can discern
any difference between files with bit rates above 160kbit/sec.46 Thankfully, when creating
music, it is not necessary to generate audio of a perfect quality. Thus, the slightly distorted (but
nonetheless arguably listenable) 128kbit/sec constant bit rate is sufficient for brute-forcing
purposes.47
128kbit/sec means 131,072 bits per second, where a bit is a Boolean value of zero or one.
Thus:

45

See supra Part II.A.
The “Great MP3 Bitrate Experiment” came to the conclusion that there was virtually no perceivable
difference in the audio quality of 160kbit/sec VBR (variable bit rate), 320kbit/sec CBR (constant bit rate),
192kbit/sec VBR, and raw CD audio. Jeff Atwood, Concluding the Great MP3 Bitrate Experiment, CODING
HORROR (June 27, 2012), http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2012/06/concluding-the-great-mp3-bitrateexperiment.html.
47
The 128kbit/sec bit rate is admittedly insufficient for high quality audio. Id. I nonetheless use
128kbit/sec for calculations for two reasons: first, perfect audio quality is not strictly necessary to produce
copyrightable material, and second, the bit rate of the audio file directly influences the size of the exponent in
determining permutations (meaning a lower bitrate begets fewer permutations). Suffice to say, the lower the bitrate,
the better.
46
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  J @128 N /C  2<E<,=PD

That is, a number with 39,457 decimal digits. As the average song is four minutes long,48
this means that the average song has 240 times the potential bits:
 



      @128 N /C  2E<,>7P,D+=

Or, a number with over 9.4 million decimal digits.
Some audio brute-forcing could also be achieved by brute-forcing the MIDI format. The
MIDI49 data format is a simplistic way in which instruments can be sequenced and re-played
digitally.50 Because the format does not store actual recordings and rather stores a sequence of
notes to re-play a song (like a sort of digital sheet music), MIDI does not act as an audio
recording,51 and thus MIDI would be a poor replacement for most songs except for certain forms
of audio (such as very basic melodies and compositions).
C. FEASIBILITY
As repeatedly emphasized, brute-forcing is a computationally expensive, inefficient, and
normatively over-the-top approach to generating anything.

Bluntly, though it may be

theoretically feasible to brute-force copyrighted material, it is anything but technically feasible to
do so with current technology.

48

Michael Twardos, Probability Distribution of Song Length in a Collection of Itunes Libraries, THE
INFORMATION DIET (Nov. 16, 2011), http://theinformationdiet.blogspot.com/2011/11/probability-distribution-ofsong-length.html (“The distribution shows the relative likelihood of the length of a song. This plot was calculated
from over 70,000 songs from 12 (American) libraries. The median of this plot is 231 seconds ans the mean is at 242
seconds. This observation may indicate something fundamental about people(culturally or biologically): we like
songs that are almost exactly 4 minutes. As you move away from the 4 minute mark, the probability drops in similar
amounts (the plot is symmetric-ish).”).
49
MIDI stands for “Musical Instrument Digital Interface.” See JEFFREY HASS, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTER MUSIC: VOLUME ONE ch. 3, available at
http://www.indiana.edu/~emusic/etext/MIDI/chapter3_MIDI.shtml.
50
See generally id. A very similar idea was discussed in the context of a “Melody Machine” by Robert
Rogoyski. Robert Rogoyski, The Melody Machine: How to Kill Copyright, and Other Problems with Protecting
Discrete Musical Elements, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 347, 351 (2006).
51
See id.
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Scholarly work discussing the feasibility of brute-forcing rarely goes beyond simple
examples because it usually needs not do so.

For the most rudimentary of brute-forcing

algorithms, the math is simple: the total number of permutations is divided by the number of
permutations that can be processed by a computer in some time unit:52
       !
 
 B   
For example, Raza et al. have calculated that a single computer calculating 1,000
password permutations per second could brute-force an 8-character password comprised of lower
case letters (that is, 268 or 208,827,064,576 permutations) in roughly 58,007.52 hours, or a little
over six years.53 As the Sun is estimated to burn out in six billion years,54 it would burn out well
before that same computer could even begin to generate all of the permutations of a four-minute
song.55
But 1,000 password permutations per second is an absolute joke for any real time
expenditure analysis, as some security websites estimate that even the ancient Pentium 100
processor could guess 10,000 passwords per second.56 More modern technology must be used to
realistically estimate the time to calculate permutations.

52

See Raza et al., A Survey of Password Attacks and Comparative Analysis on Methods for Secure
Authentication, 19 (4) WORLD APPLIED SCI. J., 439, 439 (2012); see also Jain et al., New Modified 256-bit Message
Digest Algorithm Based on Existing Algorithms, 3:1 J. COMPUTING TECH. 2278–3814 (July 2012) (analyzing brute
force time against various key sizes and permutations). Note with extremely long strings, more time is necessarily
spent storing and processing those strings, implicating a different formula.
53
Raza et al., A Survey of Password Attacks and Comparative Analysis on Methods for Secure
Authentication, 19 (4) WORLD APPLIED SCI. J., 439, 439 (2012).
54
See Fraser Cain, Life of the Sun, UNIVERSE TODAY (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://www.universetoday.com/18847/life-of-the-sun/.
55
The calculation is too large to print, but suffice to say, a number with 924 thousand decimal places does
not become much smaller when divided by the 31,540,000 seconds there are in a year. That number of years is
certainly larger than the six billion years of hydrogen in the Sun. See id.
56
See Password Recovery Speeds, LOCKDOWN.CO.UK – THE HOME COMPUTER SECURITY CENTRE,
http://www.lockdown.co.uk/?pg=combi#classA (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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In December of 2012, password cracking expert Jeremi Gosney unveiled a Linux and
OpenCL-based GPU server cluster comprising of 5 servers utilizing 25 AMD Radeon graphics
cards.57

This cluster has computing power capable of guessing 350 billion passwords per

second.58 The servers require 7kW of electricity when operational59 and likely cost well over
$10,000.60
But even Gosney’s veritable supercomputer(s) couldn’t take on creative content.
Would Gosney’s servers be able to brute-force the Google logo? Not in the Sun’s
lifetime.61 As explained above, the Google logo has 256104,500 possible permutations.62 The
number of years it would take to brute-force this password with a single one of Gosney’s server
clusters is so large that, like the number of permutations of the logo, it cannot even be printed
here. Specifically, the number of years it would take to brute-force the Google logo has 251,643
decimal digits.
57

Dan Goodin, 25-GPU Cluster Cracks Every Standard Windows Password in <6 Hours, ARS TECHNICA
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/12/25-gpu-cluster-cracks-every-standard-windows-passwordin-6-hours/.
58
Id. This is when the GPU cluster brute-forces NTLM passwords and not more complex hashes.
Arguably, the fact that such calculations are based on NTLM encryptions is insignificant: a brute-force content
creation algorithm would ideally be as computationally simple as the NTLM protocol, if not more so.
59
JEREMI M. GOSNEY, PASSWORD CRACKING HPC, PASSWORDS^12 SECURITY CONF. 17 (Dec. 13, 2012),
available at http://passwords12.at.ifi.uio.no/Jeremi_Gosney_Password_Cracking_HPC_Passwords12.pdf.
60
The cluster contains 10 AMD Radeon HD 7970s, 4 AMD Radeon HD 5970s, 3 AMD Radeon HD 6990s,
and 1 AMD Radeon HD 5870. Id. The cost of a HD 7970 is approximately $479. See Hassan Mujtaba, AMD
Officially Announces Price-Cuts for Radeon HD 7000 Series, HD 7970 Now Available for $479 MSRP, WCCF
TECH, http://wccftech.com/amd-officially-announces-pricecuts-radeon-hd-7000-series-hd-7970-479-msrp/ (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013). The price of a dual-GPU HD 5970 is approximately $599. Matthew Murray, AMD Releases
Dual-GPU Radeon HD 5970 Card, PC MAG. (Nov. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2356053,00.asp. The price of an HD 6990 is approximately $700. Sal
Cangeloso, AMD Announces the Ridiculously Powerful $700 Radeon HD 6990 Graphics Card, GEEK.COM (Mar. 8,
2011), available at http://www.geek.com/chips/amd-announces-the-ridiculously-powerful-700-radeon-hd-6990graphics-card-1320191/. The price of an HD 5870 is approximately $379. Ryan Smith, AMD’s Radeon HD 5870:
Bringing About the Next Generation of GPUs, ANANDTECH (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.anandtech.com/show/2841. This means that the graphics cards in Gosney’s servers could have cost as
much as $9,665.00, not including the enclosure, processors, motherboards, and the like. But many of these prices
(except for 7970’s price) are launch prices, meaning an equivalent server could be slightly cheaper today. Thus, for
simplicity’s sake and without better information, I estimate the price of one of Gosney’s servers to be roughly
$10,000.
61
The Sun is estimated to burn out in six billion years. See Fraser Cain, Life of the Sun, UNIVERSE TODAY
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.universetoday.com/18847/life-of-the-sun/.
62
See supra Part II.A.
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Gosney’s servers could not even brute-force a simple poem. For example, W.B. Yeats’
He wishes for the Cloths of Heaven is a relatively short poem with 327 characters, including
spaces.63 Using the ASCII 95-character set,64 this would entail 95327 permutations. Even with
the power of Gosney’s servers, it would still take more years than ever documented in human
history to brute force Yeats’ poem – more specifically, a number of years so large it has 628
decimal digits.
These astronomical figures are not made any more tolerable by throwing more servers at
the problem. Adding another server would certainly double the workload, but would cost yet
another $10,000 and yet another 7kW of electricity.65 Assuming one had the 2011 GDP of the
United States – $14.99 trillion dollars66 – this means that one could only buy at best
1,499,000,000 of Gosney’s servers, not including electrical/storage/facility/other expenses. The
result? It would still require a number of years with 619 (that is, 9 fewer) decimal digits to bruteforce Yeats’ poem and a number of years with 251,633 (that is, 10 fewer) decimal digits to bruteforce the Google logo!
These rough calculations only scratch the surface of the feasibility problem – storing
permutations is also an issue. Take, again, the Google logo, an image with 256104,500 possible
permutations.67 The Google logo is approximately 18 kilobytes in size, which is approximately
20 kilobytes as stored on a hard disk.68 To brute-force and store every possible permutation of
the Google logo, a programmer would have to make available so many terabytes that the number
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See W. B. YEATS, THE WIND AMONG THE REEDS 26 (Kessinger Publ’g 2004).
See RANDALL HYDE, THE ART OF ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE § 2.14.1 (2nd ed. 2010).
65
See JEREMI M. GOSNEY, PASSWORD CRACKING HPC, PASSWORDS^12 SECURITY CONFERENCE 17 (Dec.
13, 2012), available at http://passwords12.at.ifi.uio.no/Jeremi_Gosney_Password_Cracking_HPC_Passwords12.pdf.
66
Data: United States, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
67
See supra Part II.A; see also [Google Logo], https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo4w.png.
68
See id.
64
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of terabytes alone has over 250,000 decimal digits.69 This is exponentially more storage than the
telecommunications capacity of the entire world.70 Yeats’ poem does not fare much better –
though in plain-text it is only 335 bytes (or 0.327148 kilobytes),71 it would require a number of
terabytes of storage with 851 decimal digits72 – that is, still well over the entire
telecommunications capacity of the entire world.73
Thus, Kroemer and Kittel were as right with computers as they were with monkeys:74 if
the entire GDP of the United States can barely influence the amount of time it would take to
brute-force a copyrighted work, then it would be truly impossible to do so with current
technology absent some sort of ground-breaking invention,75 an exponential increase in
worldwide computing power,76 or dumb luck.77
D. “SMARTER” BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS
The above calculations illustrate quite well the inefficiency of brute-force attacks – as
complexity raises the possible number of permutations exponentially, brute-force attacks are all
but useless except for guessing the shortest of strings. Perhaps thankfully, beyond leveraging the

69

Where 1024 bytes = 1 kilobyte, 1024 kilobytes = 1 megabyte, 1024 megabytes = 1 gigabyte, and 1024
gigabytes = 1 terabyte. ITL EDUC. SOLUTIONS LTD., INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE 109 (2nd ed. 2011).
70
The entire effective capacity in 2007 was calculated to be 65,000 petabytes. See Martin Hilbert &
Priscilla López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 223:6205
SCI. 60 (Apr. 2011).
71
See W. B. YEATS, THE WIND AMONG THE REEDS 26 (Kessinger Publ’g 2004).
72
Where 1024 bytes = 1 kilobyte, 1024 kilobytes = 1 megabyte, 1024 megabytes = 1 gigabyte, and 1024
gigabytes = 1 terabyte. ITL EDUC. SOLUTIONS LTD., INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE 109 (2nd ed. 2011).
73
See Martin Hilbert & Priscilla López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and
Compute Information, 223:6205 SCI. 60 (Apr. 2011).
74
See supra Part I.
75
Such as the fascinating technology of quantum computing. See generally TZVETAN S. METODI, ARVIN I.
FARUQUE & FREDERIC T. CHONG, QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR COMPUTER ARCHITECTS (2011).
76
The numbers discussed in this subpart indicate that it would have to be a very large exponential increase,
far beyond the scope of Moore’s Law (which may be an increasingly poor benchmark). See S. Borkar, Obeying
Moore’s Law Beyond 0.18 Micron [Microprocessor Design], PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANNUAL IEEE INT’L
ASIC/SOC CONF. (2001).
77
Matt Kane, a Chicago artist, purported to make this possible through a website called “PixelMonkeys,”
which outputs a single random permutation of an image based upon input parameters. Kane thus purported to leave
the possibility that a copyrighted work would be duplicated up to chance. See Matt Kane, The Pixel Monkeys
Theory, PIXELMONKEYS.COM, http://www.pixelmonkeys.org/#theory (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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entire GDP of the United States,78 there is hope for those looking to brute-force the content
industry: “smart” methods of brute-forcing. As will be explained later,79 “smart” brute-forcing
solves two problems: not only can “smart” brute-forcing exponentially reduce the number of
permutations for any given string, but it can also solve various issues related to making those
permutations copyrightable.80
Any attempt to make brute-forcing “smarter” must fulfill a very important requirement:
the processing time added from the addition of “smart” code in the algorithm must be less than
the processing time expended by generating the unnecessary permutations. There is no point to
adding “smart” code to an algorithm to reduce the possible number of permutations when there is
no processing time saved (or, worse yet, where there is processing time added) by doing so.
Because such balancing would necessarily occur on a case-by-case basis, this subpart can
unfortunately only discuss the topic obliquely.
One way to exponentially reduce the number of permutations for any given format is to
brute-force with large chunks of data, as opposed to individual bits or characters. For example,
to brute-force a novel, it would not be necessary or efficient to guess every single letter of that
novel – rather, one could save time by brute-forcing using a character set composed of dictionary
words. While this increases the character set, it also lessens the length of the string, and thus the
resulting number of permutations is shortened exponentially.
The efficiency of this “chunk-based” brute-forcing is best illustrated with poetry. Robert
Frost’s poem The Road Not Taken is 729 characters (including spaces), but only 144 words.81

78

See supra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.B.
80
See id.
81
See ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN, BIRCHES, AND OTHER POEMS 9 (Coyote Canyon Press
79

2010).
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Ignoring punctuation and formatting, the difference in possible permutations is quite evident,
even taking into account the approximately 250,000 different words in the English dictionary:82


        95PDQ F R  G  1,442 J  ; J : 



   GJ  250,000<>> F R  G  778 J  ; J : 

Thus, when the length of the possible string being brute-forced is lessened by grouping
the character set into “chunks,” the number of permutations is lessened greatly. These “chunks”
could, at least theoretically, be anything – short sounds, small images, digital simulations of
paintbrushes, etc.
Brute-forcing can also be made “smarter” by the use of creative rules and an algorithm
that “learns.” Take, again, a poem. Suffice to say, few poets would write a poem that repeats the
same word incessantly, meaning that an algorithm could skip over a possible permutation that
involves the same word repeated more than three times in a row. Similarly, the same algorithm
could learn basic linguistic rules, such as the operation of adjectives and adverbs and the use of
articles such as “a” and “an.” A truly gifted programmer could also construct an algorithm that
mimics common linguistic tropes such as rhyming, alliteration, and the like to further limit the
number of potential permutations. And it goes without saying that the programmer able to create
a creatively gifted artificial neural network83 would not only make their brute-forcing program
smarter, but would also revolutionize the entire computing world.
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How Many Words Are There in the English Language?, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/words/how-many-words-are-there-in-the-english-language (last visited Mar. 23,
2013) (“[T]here are, at the very least, a quarter of a million distinct English words, excluding inflections, and words
from technical and regional vocabulary not covered by the OED, or words not yet added to the published dictionary,
of which perhaps 20 per cent are no longer in current use.”).
83
Artificial neural networks are “nonlinear mapping systems whose structure is loosely based on principles
observed in the nervous system of humans and animals.” RUSSELL D. REED & ROBERT J. MARKS, NEURAL
SMITHING : SUPERVISED LEARNING IN FEEDFORWARD ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 1 (Bradford Books 1999).
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III
CAN BRUTE-FORCED WORKS BE COPYRIGHTED?
Despite the fact that the preceding Part II all but stated that brute-forcing media is
technically impossible,84 there is still a remote possibility that a clever programmer (or, more
realistically, a collection of clever programmers) could brute-force copyright. Though it would
be nearly impossible to brute-force a four-minute song using the most inefficient brute-forcing
methods,85 using tactics similar to the “smart” brute-forcing tactics describe above,86 it is at least
conceivable that one could construct a music-making algorithm that generated Top 40 songs at
some point in the future (and hopefully before the Sun burns out87).
But technical feasibility is only the beginning. Assuming, for the sake of the argument,
that the brute-forcing of any form of media was technically possible, could what an algorithm
generates actually be copyrighted? That rather important question is precisely the subject this
Part addresses.
A. INDEPENDENT CREATION BY AN ALGORITHM
The doctrine of independent creation is the crux upon which the entire concept of bruteforcing copyright rests.
Copyright law, as its name entails, prohibits unauthorized copying.88 To establish a case
of copyright infringement vis-à-vis violation of the right to reproduce a work,89 a plaintiff must

84

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.B.
86
See supra Part II.D.
87
See supra Part II.C (briefly discussing the lifespan of the Sun as a reference against the feasibility of
brute-force attacks).
88
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER SETH MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 417 (6th ed. Aspen Law & Bus. 2012) (“Copyrights do not give their owner the exclusive
right to prevent others from making, using, or selling their creations. Rather, they give the author only the right to
prevent unauthorized copying of their works, as well as the right to prevent some limited types of uses of those
works”).
89
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
85
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prove either directly or circumstantially that the defendant copied her copyrighted work.90
Because direct copying is often difficult to prove, plaintiffs can circumstantially prove copying
by showing that a defendant had (1) access to the plaintiff’s work and that there was (2) a
substantial similarity between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work.91
The doctrine of independent creation, a “cornerstone” of copyright law,92 is a rebuttal of a
plaintiff’s case of direct or circumstantial copyright infringement which argues that the alleged
infringer created the allegedly infringing work wholly independently of the copyright holder’s
work and usually without knowledge of that work.93

In this way, the doctrine tracks the

requirement that all creative works must be independently created to be original and therefore
amenable to copyrighting.94
In Mazer v. Stein,95 the Supreme Court provided an example of when the doctrine of
independent creation applies:
Two men, each a perfectionist, independently make maps of the same territory. Though
the maps are identical each may obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his
particular map, and yet neither will infringe the other's copyright.96
But, of course, independent creation does not only protect creative works that are based
off of some constant referent, like how maps are (hopefully) based upon the geography of a
region.97 As eloquently stated by Learned Hand in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,98

90

MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 520; see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1946); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997). This test is also phrased in a way that
requires proof of “improper appropriation,” see MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 527; however, this
is not discussed here because brute-force content creation does not by definition involve the sort of
character/trope/detail specific variations typically involved in such an analysis. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (comparing two different plays by analyzing such details).
91
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th
Cir. 1997); see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 520–527.
92
3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:32 (2012).
93
See id; see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2002).
94
MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 421.
95
347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954).
96
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18, 74 S. Ct. 460, 470–71, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954) (citing Fred Fisher,
Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)).
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[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on
a Grecian Urn, he would be an “author,” and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy
that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.99
In other words, when two parties create the same work, both independently own a
copyright in their respective works even if the two works are exactly the same.100 This is not the
case in patent law, which gives a patent holder the right to prevent the independent creation of a
patented invention for the duration of the patent.101
Because an argument of independent creation often implicitly concedes the second prong
of a circumstantial copying case102 – that is, the similarity of the plaintiff’s work and the
defendant’s work – independent creation cases often hinge on the degree of access that the
defendant had to the plaintiff’s work.103

Along these lines, the best invocations of the

independent creation doctrine are made by defendants who could not have possibly had any
access to the plaintiff’s work – for example, a musician on a remote island with no radio

97

Naturally, in the context of maps and other materials based upon constant referents, courts have found
the doctrine of independent creation quite useful. See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150–51
(S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“No one doubts that two directories, independently made, are each entitled to copyright, regardless
of their similarity, even though it amount to identity. Each being the result of original work, the second will be
protected, quite regardless of its lack of novelty. But the best instance is in the case of maps. Here, if each be
faithful, identity is inevitable, because each seeks only to set down the same facts in precisely the same relations to
each other. So far as each is successful, each will be exactly the same.”).
98
81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
99
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
100
See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
101
See 2 JOHN MILLS, DONALD REILEY & ROBERT HIGHLEY, PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 6:3 (2d ed.) (“A
copyright, unlike a patent, does not give its owner ‘the right to exclude’ anyone who created the work independently
of the author through whom the copyright is derived.”); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright,
90 VA. L. REV. 465, 525 (2004) (“Independent creation is no defense to a claim of patent infringement.”).
102
With alternate pleading and the like, this is not always the case.
103
Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (discussing how similarity is
inherent in the independent creation of “faithful” maps). Note that some courts view the relationship between
similarity and access as a sliding scale. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir.
1997) (“If, therefore, two works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one is a copy of the earlier
one, the issue of access need not be addressed separately, since if the later work was a copy its creator must have
had access to the original.”) (citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984)); Carew v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures, 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (“If there is identity, then access is, in itself, of no importance
whatsoever”). Ostensibly, this sliding scale is merely a presumption that can be rebutted by showing the legitimate
possibility of independent creation.
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access.104

Of course, a defendant does not need to abscond to a remote island to claim

independent creation: even where plausible arguments are made that a defendant may have had
access to a work, courts are reluctant to find access without a strong showing of substantial
similarity, and even then such a finding is not automatic.105
It almost goes without saying that a brute-force content creation algorithm is the ideal
artificial musician on a remote island without radio access.106 A brute-force content creation
algorithm cannot deliberately or accidentally duplicate copyrighted works unless programmed to
do so. When such an algorithm creates works substantially similar to the others’ works, it does
so without even the remotest hint of access, providing the perfect defense to any allegation of
copying.
But this application of independent creation to brute-force content creation may rely upon
an unnecessarily formal understanding of independent creation. Professor Clarisa Long of the
University of Virginia has argued that the independent creation privilege exists, at least in part,
as a mechanism to impose an actual notice requirement on alleged infringers.107 This makes a lot
of sense: the common examples of independent creation are not where an infringer intentionally
avoids copyrighted material to “accidentally” duplicate it, but rather where that infringer is
unintentionally unaware of the existence of similar copyrighted material.108 If Long is correct
and the doctrine of independent creation is a question of actual notice, then a brute-force content

104

3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:36 (2012).
See, e.g., Sarkadi v. Wiman, 135 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding plaintiff's showings of access and
indirect showings of access by similarity insufficient); see also 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:28
(2012) (“Independent creation may, nevertheless, still be found where plaintiff referred to (but did not copy)
another's work, and, where plaintiff received only ideas or suggestions from others.”).
106
See 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:36 (2012) (giving the remote island hypothetical).
107
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 529 (2004); see also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 345–46
(1989) (discussing search costs avoided through the doctrine of independent creation).
108
See supra Part II.A (providing two examples from case law, both involving infringers that did not
intentionally avoid other works).
105
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creation algorithm may not independently create content. This is because the creation of a bruteforce content creation algorithm designed and intended to independently create arguably
involves constructive notice of the existence of potential infringement, as the operator of such an
algorithm would have reason to know the algorithm could easily infringe existing copyrights.
B. “CREATION” BY FORCE
Though a brute-force content creation algorithm is almost perfectly amenable to the
doctrine of independent creation, that does not necessarily mean what it creates is copyrightable.
In fact, there are reasons why what it generates is likely not copyrightable. This has interesting
ramifications for a hypothetical brute-forcing business entity: while a valid copyright is not a
prerequisite to invoking the doctrine of independent creation, a valid copyright is necessary to
market generated permutations without inviting competitors to copy the permutations as they
wish.109
Copyright protection exists in “original works of authorship” that are “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”110 “Original[ity],” as developed by the courts, entails (1)
independent creation (discussed above111) and a (2) “modicum of creativity.”112 The bar for this
modicum of creativity requirement is incredibly low: an “author” must merely contribute
something more than a “merely trivial” variation,113 and courts explicitly refuse to judge the
artistic merit of a work.114

109

Though, as I discuss below, an entity could craft a ProCD-esque contract to bind users of the
permutations to limit their dissemination or use of the permutations.
110
17 U.S.C. § 102.
111
See supra Part III.A. The defensive use of independent creation involves the same inquiry as the use of
independent creation involved in establishing that some creative work can be copyrighted. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY,
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:30 (2012) (discussing both the requirement for copyright and the defense as substantially
the same).
112
MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 88, at 421.
113
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–103 (2d Cir. 1951).
114
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
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Though it is almost certain given the discussion above that a brute-force content creation
algorithm independently creates,115 it is questionable whether or not an algorithm can possess a
“modicum of creativity.” Admittedly, as stated above, courts set the bar of creativity for a
copyrightable work at the floor in analyzing copyrightable material.116

In fact, given the

weakness of the modicum of creativity requirement, older courts characterized the originality
requirement as merely a re-statement of the prohibition on copying.117 But recent Supreme
Court precedent indicates that the creativity requirement will be enforced where, for example, an
alleged “creation” is merely an alphabetic arrangement of names in a directory with no creativity
involved in the arrangement of those names.118
It is not entirely clear that this strengthened modicum of creativity requirement is met
where a computer is programmed to blindly generate every possible permutation of a type of
creative work. The generation of permutations does not necessarily entail plausibly creative
activity, such as making “choices as to [the] selection and arrangement” of data.119

If a

mechanically and functionally arranged “list” of names in alphabetical order is not
copyrightable,120 a court may refuse to find that a “list” of every possible permutation of a format
of creative work, similarly mechanically and functionally arranged, entails a modicum of
creativity.

115

See supra Part III.A.
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287, 113 L.
Ed. 2d 358 (1991) (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude,
humble or obvious’ it might be.”).
117
See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–103 (2d Cir. 1951).
118
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358
(1991). This ruling allegedly reinstated prior law which prohibited so-called “sweat of the brow” copyrights – that
is, copyrights for works that resulted from mere labor, not creativity. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 3:27 (2012).
119
Id. at 348.
120
See id.
116
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This modicum of creativity requirement may not be a problem if a brute-force content
generation algorithm were designed to be creative. If an algorithm used “smart” brute-forcing121
to intelligently generate a poem from a dictionary list of words using various evaluative subalgorithms to determine the quality of a sentence or phrase, a modicum of creativity may be
present.
Notwithstanding its creativity or lack thereof, is a brute-force content creation algorithm
even an “author?”122
It doesn’t take much to be an “author” of a copyrighted work.

In Burrow-Giles

Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,123 the Supreme Court said that “author” meant someone “to whom
anything owes its origin, originator, maker.”124 Following this loose definition, courts do not
even require that an author physically fix the required creative expression herself: even a
paralyzed author can be an “author” in American copyright law.125
It is thus generally assumed that, because a human is (usually) necessarily involved in the
creation of computer code, computer-generated works including brute-force content creation
algorithms are copyrightable, with some human being (such as the programmer or operator of the

121

See supra Part II.D.
17 U.S.C. § 201 (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors
of the work.”) (emphasis added).
123
111 U.S. 53, 4 S. Ct. 279, 28 L. Ed. 349 (1884).
124
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58, 4 S. Ct. 279, 281, 28 L. Ed. 349 (1884).
125
This was discussed in Fisher v. Klein, 1990 WL 10072477 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1990):
122

[U]nder the copyright law that authorship, even with respect to sculptors, need not be in the form
of the manipulation of the material. [W]e had some discussion of the concept of a sculptor who might sit in
a chair, never moving and never touching the materials, perhaps in part because he might be paralyzed or
simply because the materials might be large and heavy. There are sculptors nowadays who work in huge
materials, I-beams, storage tanks, things like that, that are welded together where the sculptor's contribution
is rendered entirely by the giving of instructions to workmen to put a member in a certain position and bolt
it to another member and so forth. I think it is clear without question that such participation in authorship.
Such carrying out of ideas of authorship is recognized as authorship under the copyright law even if the
author never places his hand on the material.
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program) as an author.126 Accordingly, the creator of an image who creates that image entirely
using a computer image processing program (like Photoshop) is the author of that image for the
purposes of copyright law. Even though some scholarship argues that the Patent and Copyright
Clause may permit a non-human author (such as an artificial intelligence) to be the “author” of a
copyrightable work,127 it is unlikely that such a doctrine would be necessary when an algorithm
is programmed and run under the supervision of a human being. This is especially the case with
“smart” brute-forcing,128 where a programmer’s creativity and decisionmaking is more obviously
present in the algorithm’s programming. Assuming that a brute-force content creation algorithm
was entirely independent and somehow did not involve the work of a programmer, this might be
a different story129 – however, it seems unlikely such an problem would ever arise, as even
programming self-modifying code is quite a chore.130
Thus, brute-force content creation is almost by definition perfectly amenable to the
doctrine of independent creation, and what it creates may be copyrightable if a modicum of
creativity on the part of the algorithm is found.
But the law does not work in a vacuum.

Just because something can generate

copyrightable material does not mean that it would be found noninfringing.

126

This is a grandiose oversimplification of the fascinating topic of computer-generated works. For an
excellent, albeit slightly old, analysis of the issue of computer-generated works, including the issue of authorship
vesting in an artificial intelligence, see Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases,
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042–72 (1993).
127
See id.
128
See supra Part II.D.
129
See generally Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042–72 (1993).
130
On the topic of self-modifying code, see generally Hongxu Cai, Zhong Shao & Alexander Vaynberg,
Certified Self-Modifying Code, PROC. 2007 ACM SIGPLAN CONF. ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION (PLDI’07) 66–77, available at http://flint.cs.yale.edu/flint/publications/smc.pdf.
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IV
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS AND REALITIES OF A BRUTE-FORCED WORLD
Even if an entity actually attempted to brute-force copyright, and even if it managed to
copyright what it made, it would not be legally immunized. In fact, the attempted creation or use
of brute-forced creative material may be the first shot in an all-out copyright war.
Potential brute-force content generation business structures range the gamut from the
nefarious to the benign. On one hand, a true profiteer could operate a number of brute-force
content creation servers to find and sell all permutations that resembled existing works. On the
other hand, a public interest organization dissatisfied with current copyright law could bruteforce creative works to attack the entire concept of the ownership of creative works131 by giving
the public a free license to anything generated by the algorithm. Either business model could
elect to search for valuable permutations itself or elect to allow third parties to search for
valuable permutations they wished to purchase. Suffice to say, there are many permutations to
the brute-forcing business model.132
That being said, with the act of brute-forcing content itself as the common denominator
of any such business model, many things can be said about the legal ramifications of content
brute-forcing: namely, that any attempt at brute-forcing copyright would almost certainly be
found to infringe existing copyrights.
A. AN ALGORITHM DESIGNED TO INFRINGE(?)

131

This organization could, for example, intentionally target works that would have gone into the public
domain had the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act not gone into
effect. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 181 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct.
769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003); see also Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2004),
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/story_lessig_marapr04.msp.
132
I apologize for the terrible pun.
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One infringes copyright by violating a copyright holder’s exclusive rights.133 Among
many other rights, including those tailored to the nuances of specific creative works,134 a
copyright holder has the exclusive right to “reproduce [their] copyrighted work in copies.”135
These “copies” include “substantially similar” reproductions made by any means “now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”136 Strictly speaking, this
infringement inquiry does not rely upon whether or not the allegedly infringing materials can be
copyrighted, as such a question comes after the question of whether or not such allegedly
infringing materials infringe existing copyrights.

If a court finds that allegedly infringing

materials are independently created such that they can be copyrighted,137 then it has already
decided that such materials are not copies and thus cannot infringe.138

Conversely, no

independent creation means no copyright and potentially means infringement.139
If the content generated by a brute-force content creation algorithm was not amenable to
the doctrine of independent creation, then the operator that algorithm would be in trouble:
virtually every permutation generated by the algorithm could potentially infringe others’
copyrights, as it would make both actual and substantially similar copies of copyrighted works in
violation of numerous copyright holders’ exclusive right to reproduce their work in copies.140
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Independent creation acts as both a defense to copyright infringement as well as a requirement for a
copyright under the Copyright Act. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:32 (2012); 2 WILLIAM F.
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That is, rather than independently creating many copyrighted works, the operator would
effectively be potentially infringing every single copyright in existence!
But even if such permutations were found to be independently created, a court could still
find that such permutations were infringing despite the limitations of modern copyright law. A
court presented with a brute-force content creation algorithm could simply ignore the specific
machinations of the algorithm, reducing its creation and operation to mere window-dressing
around an attempt to infringe copyright in an intentionally obfuscated manner. After all, what
judge would hold “independently created” copyrighted works generated from an algorithm valid
when such a holding would facilitate a massive loophole around current copyright law and allow
the mass creation of copies of copyrighted works?141
This less technical concept of infringement may seem like an extreme way to bend
copyright law to punish seemingly “bad” behavior, but courts are no strangers to extending
copyright law where they feel, for policy or other reasons, such an extension is warranted. The
best example of courts extending copyright law in this way is the development of the law of
contributory infringement. Unlike patent law,142 the Copyright Act “does not expressly render
anyone liable for infringement committed by another.”143

But copyright law nonetheless

imposes liability for copyright infringement against “certain parties who have not themselves
engaged in the infringing activity.”144 A court might similarly find extra-statutory infringement
where a party intentionally sets up a brute-force content creation algorithm to create identical or
substantially similar copies of copyrighted works, even if the operation of that algorithm may not
infringe under any current legal doctrine.
141

It could also essentially decimate the world of copyright. See infra Part IV.D.
See 37 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c).
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35, 104 S. Ct. 774, 785, 78 L. Ed.
2d 574 (1984).
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But this is not the end of the analysis. A brute-force content creation algorithm can both
infringe and not infringe copyright: after all, a brute-force content creation algorithm can
generate already copyrighted material as well as wholly novel (and thus not copyrighted)
material in the same second. Thus, brute-force content creation algorithms are amenable via
analogy145 to case law that involves products and devices that, like brute-force content generation
algorithms, only sometimes infringe copyright.
The case law about devices that sometimes infringe emerges from a case involving a
now-dead technology: videotape recorders. In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,146 the Supreme Court held that the sale of equipment that could potentially duplicate
copyrighted works (in this case, videotape recorders that could record live television) was not
itself contributory copyright infringement:
[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.147
In other words, the Court held that the seller of a device that can be used to infringe is not
liable for their purchasers’ infringements as long as their device can be used for some other noninfringing purpose.148 Subsequent courts have held that these “other purposes” – known as
“substantial noninfringing uses” – need not even be actual, but merely capable, now or in the
future.149

This substantial noninfringing use doctrine does not, however, provide absolute

immunity where actual infringement under the control of the device’s creator takes place: courts
often emphasize that computer system operators still have a duty to purge infringing material on
145

“By analogy” because Sony and Grokster both are contributory infringement cases. As I discuss later in
this subpart, this may be largely irrelevant.
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464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984).
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442, 104 S. Ct. 774, 789, 78 L. Ed. 2d
574 (1984).
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Id.
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A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001).
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their systems when they learn about it regardless of the substantial noninfringing uses their
system may have.150
An important asterisk must be placed on the Sony decision: when courts smell bad intent
on the part of a device’s creator, they find liability even where the device in question has
substantial noninfringing uses. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., the Court
acknowledged that the file-sharing services Grokster and Streamcast had potential noninfringing
uses,151 but nonetheless found that, because Grokster and Streamcast advertised and encouraged
infringement on their services,152 a court could find that those file-sharing services induced
copyright infringement.153 Specifically, the Court held that a party could be liable for copyright
infringement by “distribut[ing] a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement.”154
But there is an asterisk to the Grokster asterisk: this intent inquiry does not impose an
affirmative duty upon a defendant to prevent copyright infringement. In footnote 12 of the
Grokster opinion, the Court made a critical exception to its ruling:
[I]n the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent
infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such
a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor.155
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See, e.g., id. at 1021.
Though the Court nonetheless was of the view that the service(s) were primarily used for infringing
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Does a brute-force content creation algorithm have a substantial noninfringing use, now
or in the future? The answer is unequivocally yes, at least in the abstract. But Grokster intent is
a problem.
As already stated above, an algorithm designed to generate every possible permutation of
text, images, or music is not specifically designed to infringe copyright – it generates both
copyrighted and un-copyrighted material alike.156 In the same second an image brute-forcing
algorithm reproduces a copyrighted photograph, it may generate an aesthetically pleasing pattern
that has never been created or even seen before. Thus, at least in the broadest sense, a bruteforce content creation algorithm certainly has substantial noninfringing uses under Sony.157
But more realistically, a brute-force algorithm is valuable at least in part because it has
the ability to independently create already copyrighted works.

In other words, brute-force

content creation algorithms exploit a loophole in copyright law. And that’s where Grokster
intent becomes a problem.
Assume a group of entrepreneurs with the time, money, and know-how to create an
efficient and operative brute-force content creation business.

As discussed above, such a

business would require an astounding amount of time, money, and resources158 – after all, a
single one of Gosney’s server clusters costs approximately $10,000.159 It makes sense that this
business would seek return on its expensive server investments, and one of the easiest ways to do
this would be to sell independently created duplicates of existing copyrighted works.160 This
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business model would require a remarkably low amount of effort on the part of the brute-forcing
entity as, rather than spending the time and money sifting through permutation after permutation
to ascertain market value by itself, the brute-forcing entity could create a search engine where
potential purchasers could search through a collection of algorithm-generated works to find what
they wanted to buy.161

Needless to say, if the brute-forcing entity sold licenses to its

permutations for less than copies of the original works cost,162 the it could easily profit.
Accordingly, even though an otherwise infringing brute-force content creation algorithm
may have substantial noninfringing uses, considering its use would almost certainly involve the
nefarious intent to undermine copyright, the Grokster exception would almost certainly apply
and the algorithm’s substantial noninfringing uses would not provide a defense to infringement.
Such an algorithm may not be itself commercially distributed as was the case in Grokster,163 but
this is almost certainly immaterial: Sony itself involved sale and distribution,164 so it is unlikely
that a defendant could invoke Sony as a defense without implicitly conceding that both Sony and
Grokster apply when no sale or distribution occurs.
But assuming that the owners of the brute-force content generation algorithm were not
nefarious profiteers, Grokster’s footnote 12 could provide a valuable safe harbor. If those
utilizing a brute-force content creation algorithm did so not because of a desire to undermine
copyright but instead because of a legitimate desire to produce new and unique works, then the
mere fact that copyrighted work incidentally appeared on their storage devices would be
161

The potential infringement ramifications of these searches are discussed infra in Part IV.B.
An entity could arguably sell contractual “licenses” even if the permutations were not amenable to
copyright. Contracts may legally bind parties to copyright-like terms even when the contractual res is not amenable
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inconsequential.165 Such do-gooders would not have an affirmative duty to sift through every
permutation and delete infringing content to act within the ambit of copyright law.166
Unfortunately, these do-gooders would likely be forced to sift through every permutation
anyway to find something useful in a massive database of algorithm-generated nonsense.
Thus, the operator of a brute-force content creation algorithm would in most
circumstances be infringing many copyrights, if not potentially every copyright in existence.
Even though the Sony line of cases might appear to immunize brute-forcing behavior by analogy,
those cases would not provide a defense to those most likely to operate a brute-force content
creation algorithm: profiteers looking to generate plausibly legal copies of existing copyrighted
works. Simply put, a brute-force content creation algorithm is one massive infringement case
waiting to happen, even if a court has to proverbially bend over backwards to make it such.
B. THE INDUCEMENT PROBLEM
A brute-force content creation algorithm could also infringe copyright depending on the
way third parties use brute-forced permutations. This could occur in two ways: first, by merely
allowing parties to search through the permutations themselves, and second, by selling or giving
parties permutations to enable those third parties to infringe.
As illustrated in Part I,167 a brute-forcing algorithm can easily generate a huge number of
permutations. This is a problem: manually sifting through permutations to find something
valuable (such as an exact duplicate of another’s copyrighted work) would be prohibitively
expensive and time-consuming, especially considering how reasonable minds could differ as to
the artistic merit of any given permutation.
165
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An easier way to search through permutations would be to use a computer system to find
a duplicate of an already existing copyrighted work within the permutations,168 but this raises an
infringement issue. Assuming that merely storing and generating brute-forced permutations did
not constitute infringement in and of itself,169 could searching through these permutations to find
a copyrighted work constitute a form of infringement by either the brute-forcing entity or a third
party? If a third party used an existing copyrighted work (like an image) to find a duplicate of it
in a brute-force content collection, would that act constitute infringement?
The mere indexing and searching of content is not, in and of itself, an infringement of
copyright. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,170 Perfect 10 sued Google and Amazon.com
for copyright infringement because both defendants allowed users to search for Perfect 10
material stored on third party websites.171 Because neither defendant stored the full versions of
Perfect 10’s photographs,172 the court found that the defendants did not infringe Perfect 10’s
display right as to the full versions of the works.173 In other words, only where storage of
infringing works occurs will liability attach.174 Perfect 10 indicates that, absent some other form
of infringement involving the subject material, making indexing and searching of non-infringing
material feasible is not independently a violation of copyright.
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Google already does something similar with their Google Images search engine: a user can upload any
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Thus, where infringement arguments based upon the storage of brute-force generated
content fail, the aforementioned search argument would fail as well. While there might be an
argument that the use of an existing copyrighted work as a referent in the process of searching
for a duplicate of it is a form of infringement, this does not seem to be a particularly fruitful
argument. Given the strength of the underlying infringement argument discussed above,175 this
is not truly a major loss for a would-be plaintiff.
Perhaps more important is the question of third party infringement by using brute-forced
permutations as a substitute for copyrighted material. While the concept of secondary liability in
copyright is “muddied,”176 it is generally accepted that one who, “with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,
may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”177

If brute-forced permutations are not

amenable to copyright,178 the provision of those permutations to third parties to enable those
parties to indirectly acquire existing copyrighted works without acquiring a license to those
copyrighted works would almost certainly be a form of contributory infringement. After all, part
of the value of brute-forced permutations would be their similarity to existing copyrighted work,
and the purchaser of such a low-cost permutation would almost certainly not possess a license to
the original work. Selling those permutations would be little better than selling pirated copies of
a copyrighted movie on the Internet.
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A brute-force content creation entity could potentially limit its contributory infringement
liability under this scenario by carefully contracting with the third party buyers of its
permutations. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
allowed a software manufacturer to enforce so-called “shrink-wrap licenses” – that is, licenses
included with software that placed additional limitations on the use of that software – that
extended protection of its works beyond the scope afforded to them under the Copyright Act.179
The court in Zeidenberg allowed these shrink-wrap licenses because “[c]ontracts . . . generally
affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive
rights.’”180 ProCD thus seems to embrace the idea that a brute-force content generating entity
could create and enforce shrink-wrap licenses (or their equivalent) to prevent third-parties from
using a permutation without a license from the original copyright holder, thereby potentially
avoiding contributory infringement liability. Given the controversy of ProCD,181 it may not be
the case that such a contract would be upheld in every court, but shrink wrap licenses are
nonetheless an option for an already risk-taking brute-forcing entity.
C. THE TRADEMARK DIMENSION
Brute-force content creation would almost certainly entail the mass replication of both
registered and unregistered trademarks. This could make the content produced by a brute-force
content creation algorithm a trademark infringement landmine. But, perhaps thankfully, because
permutations are unlikely to create consumer confusion, it is unlikely that a brute-force content
creation algorithm would ever be found to infringe trademark.
179
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“Trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, device, or combination used by a person
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others.182

A trademark must be inherently distinctive – that is, unique and

immediately identifiable as identifying a unique product source – or must have “secondary
meaning” – which means the mark must have an established connection with a unique product
source.183 Once these requirements are established, when a mark is federally registered, the mere
act of using that mark in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services such that
the use would “likely . . . cause confusion” is infringement of that mark.184 When a mark is
unregistered, the use must cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the “affiliation,
connection, or association” of the entity with the mark’s owner to constitute infringement.185 In
either case, there is no independent creation defense in trademark law.186
Arguably, the sale or even provision of brute-forced content could be considered a form
of trademark infringement. For example, an image brute-forcing algorithm might generate an
image permutation that depicted the Nike logo or an audio permutation that used the trademarked
slogan “King of Beers.”187

As the argument might go, because trademark law has no

independent creation doctrine,188 the sale or use of such a permutation could constitute an
infringing use of that trademark.
Unfortunately for a would-be plaintiff, it is not clear whether consumers would be
actually confused by a brute-force content generation algorithm’s use of a mark such that the
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existence of that mark in a permutation would be infringing. With the right disclaimers, a bruteforcing entity could avoid creating consumer confusion in the way that would expose itself to
liability for infringement.189 But such a disclaimer may not be necessary. In Medic Alert
Foundation U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp.,190 the court held that the presence of a logo in a software
clipart library collection was not trademark infringement because users would not have been
confused into believing that the owner of each respective mark was endorsing the defendant’s
collection.191 A brute-forced content collection is arguably analogous to a collection of clipart:
neither use trademarks in a way that implicate association, sponsorship, or any affiliation such
that consumers would be confused. This is especially the case where consumers know about the
nature of the permutations: no rational consumer would believe that an algorithmically generated
permutation was intentionally designed to affiliate with a unique product source. Thus, it is
unlikely that a court would find consumer confusion if a trademark was generated by a bruteforce content creation algorithm.
A more viable approach might be the argument of dilution by blurring, but Medic Alertlike issues still apply. Where a famous mark is used by a party in a way that could potentially
dilute the potency of that mark (by reducing its ability to identify a single source and maintain
selling power or the like), the owner of that mark may sue.192 The test for dilution by blurring
involves a number of factors, including whether the user of the mark intended to create an
association with the famous mark and whether there was any actual association between the
allegedly infringing mark and the famous mark.193 Assuming some famous mark (such as the
189
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Nike swoosh) made its way into a permutation, trademark infringement would plausibly exist.
But the Medic Alert problem still exists for a would-be plaintiff. Given that the nature of the use
of a famous mark is evaluated in a case of dilution by blurring,194 a court could plausibly find
that, like in Medic Alert, the incidental use of a mark in a database that was unlikely to cause
consumer confusion would not qualify as dilution by blurring.
One factor that almost certainly does not influence either trademark infringement
calculus is whether or not the brute-forcing entity purported to provide its brute-forced content
for free. Non-commercial use is a defense to trademark infringement, though it has never been
entirely clear what non-commercial use entails.195 Thus, at least theoretically, if a brute-forcing
entity provided its work for free, it could avoid being liable for trademark infringement. But this
result is only theoretical: it ignores the fact that, even if it provided its content for free, a noncommercial entity would usually seek to provide its content for free to directly undermine or
manipulate the market for copyrighted materials (unless, of course, it was simply hunting for
unique patterns or novel permutations or the like).196 This sort of behavior is quite unlike the
archetypal non-commercial trademark user who, for example, uses a trademark to complain
about a company.197 Thus, even though infringement is unlikely to be proven, non-commercial
use of brute-forced permutations would not provide a defense would brute-force content creation
infringe trademark.
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D. COPYRIGHT WAR
The idea that any entity could brute-force copyright is positively frightening. If a single
entity could construct an algorithm that made every possible 4-minute song ever, then that entity
would have the power to sell exact copies of other artists’ 4-minute songs for cheaper than the
artists sold them. The incentive to create could become a disincentive, as musicians would
suddenly find even the most original songs they could ever compose anticipated by a computer
algorithm that could undercut their profits.
In loftier constitutional terms, a brute-force content creation algorithm would prevent
copyright from “promot[ing] the Progress of Science.”198
Or, more bluntly, it would kill copyright.
Suffice to say, it is unlikely that a court would ever allow this to happen in the first place.
Before such a scheme could ever begin, it is almost certain that a court would stop a brute-force
content creator through one or more methods – be it a strict “modicum of creativity” standard,199
an attenuated standard of infringement,200 or the like. This is especially the situation where, in
most cases, Grokster intent would weigh against the operator of a brute-force content creation
algorithm.201
But assuming through some apocalyptic judicial catastrophe that the above arguments
failed, would a party operating a brute-force content generation algorithm win? Once that party
gets past the hurdles of skirting the copyright and trademark infringement issues discussed
above, are they legally home free?
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The answer is almost certainly no, because such an algorithm would kill copyright. The
fact that a brute-force content creation algorithm would in effect give a copyright in every
possible work ever to a single party would give every single judge, legislator, and citizen a
reason to specifically prohibit that from happening. When someone finds a loophole in the law
that grants them a legal right to every creative work that could ever be created, the societal
response would never be “you win” – it would be “we need to amend the laws.”
In other words, operating a brute-force content creation algorithm would be the first shot
in all-out copyright war between a single entity and the entire legal and political community of
the United States, if not the world. It is not hard to imagine who would win.
V
CONCLUSION: WHY “NEVER” IS A GOOD THING
As has been repeatedly emphasized in this paper, it is almost certain that it is
technically202 and legally203 impossible for anyone to brute-force copyright in the near future.
This is, unquestionably, a very good thing.
Imagine a brute-forced collection of four-minute sound recordings. What would be
within those recordings? Not just songs, but human experiences. Four minute conversations,
laughs, cries, speeches – quite literally everything. The whole of the human experience that
could be heard would, insofar as it fits into a four minute digital recording, be located on
computer disks squirreled away within a huge series of processing servers. This would include
everything you have ever heard, as well as everything you will ever hear. This is no less the case
for an attempted brute-force attack on images the size of a Google logo – everything that could
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ever be seen that could be represented in a small bundle of pixels on a monitor would be
generated and stored.
As disappointing as it may be that current technology cannot yet brute-force creative
content,204 this is actually a good thing: it proves how amazingly diverse and unique the world
can be. If it were easy to simply brute-force through every song ever made, then the actual
number of songs that could ever be made would be rather small.205 There is no romance or
magic to a world of creative content that can be divided, processed, and in the end conquered by
an emotionless machine designed to feign creative activity.
Of course, creative activity does not rely upon copyright, and if copyright were to
disappear, many authors would still create amazing works. But a brute-force content creation
attack is not merely a war upon copyright: it is a war on creation. It is an attempt to preclude
anyone from creating anything truly new ever again, even if the algorithm itself never uses the
work it generates.
This is why, somewhat counter-intuitively, we should hope that technology is never able
to process the insane number of permutations discussed in Part II.206 When all songs, paintings,
and poems have been generated, then the desire for artists to pick up their respective guitars,
paint brushes, and pens will be inhibited, if not entirely destroyed, and part of the enjoyment that
arises from creative material – that is, the knowledge that an individual or group individuals
poured their lives and selves into a project for others’ enjoyment – would be decimated.
Thus, my discussion ends not with a legal conclusion, but a normative one: the world
does not need brute-force content creation algorithms. In an attempt to make money, someone
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running such an algorithm would not merely kill copyright – they would kill the entire human
drive to create around which copyright laws have formed.

